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A New Role for Transparency
ANN M. FLORINI
Anns control has traditionally dealt with limiting the means of destruction.
When the greatest threat to security came from the potential for organized
violence inflicted by an external enemy against a state, arms control
logically sought to limit that danger. But as the threats to security have
become more diffuse, policy-makers will need to draw on a wider repertoire
of tools to reduce the potential destructiveness of less organized threats, and
even emerging unintended dangers.
Over the past few decades, arms control has contributed a tool to
international diplomacy that may address some of these growing threats.
That tool is transparency. Transparency refers here to the provision of
information by an actor about its own activities and capabilities to other
actors. More and more, transparency is a norm - that is, a standard of
behaviour to which actors are held, one that has become increasingly
entrenched in international security relations, politics, business practices,
and policies of environmental protection.1 It has roots in many areas, from
the spread of democracy to the demands of globalized business to the
requirements under arms control for states to provide other states with vast
quantities of information about their military capabilities and organizations.
This new norm contributed significantly to the end of the Cold War
through the verification provisions and confidence-building measures
associated with arms control in the 1980s, but its future role will be even
more important.2 In a world characterized by multipolarity, the diffusion of
some forms of power from state actors to other types of actor, the
proliferation of both weapons of mass destruction and precision guidance
technologies, the widespread breakdown of political authority, and the
distribution of environmentally toxic materials on a unprecedented scale,
protecting humanity and the planet will demand even higher levels of
transparency in regard to who has access to which materials and
technologies and who is doing what with them.
It has been proposed that transparency could serve as the cornerstone of
non-proliferation and broader cooperative security efforts.3 But this raises
many questions about what information should be made available, to whom,
and for what purposes. One way to work through these questions is by
making comparisons with another issue area where transparency already
has started to play a crucial role (at least within the United States): the
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prevention of environmental toxification. Proliferation and environmental
toxification share characteristics beyond the grave risks they pose to human
well-being, risks that are not being adequately addressed by current
policies.4 Both involve the need to regulate substances that are widely,
legitimately, and necessarily used in economic transactions (sometimes
even the same substances). In both cases, moreover, centralized control
systems which exclusively involve states will not suffice.
Thinking about how to use transparency measures to address
proliferation and toxification requires a long-term perspective, because the
solutions to proliferation and toxification require a substantial incubation
period. Achieving the necessary degree of transparency will require a norm
change. New norms do not emerge spontaneously: particularly at the
international level they are often the product of concerted effort sustained
over long periods.5
This essay looks at the problems of proliferation and toxification over
the long term, describes why these problems will require a transparency-
based approach, and analyses what that approach should entail. The next
section examines the trends likely to alter and intensify the nature of the
proliferation threat, as well as to increase demand for environmentally
hazardous products and production processes that could result in
toxification. The paper then discusses specific characteristics of the
problems of proliferation and toxification and argues that the traditional
strategies used to address these dangers - denial of access to dangerous
materials and after-the-fact countermeasures - will prove inadequate in the
new context. Next, it shows that alternative policies that rely on the public
revelation of information about economic transactions and processes can
alter behaviour more effectively than can more familiar types of regulation.
The paper concludes with a discussion of the prospects for applying the
transparency-based approach to proliferation and toxification at the
international level.
The Trends6
If no policy changes are made, in the next two to three decades the world
could become a much more hazardous place, with new dangers emerging
from a diffuse set of actors and sources. In particular, over the next few
decades, the dangers posed by the proliferation of weaponry and by
environmental toxification may increase significantly. Although these are
usually thought of as two quite different problems, they share many root
causes. In the short term it may be possible to ignore them, or to manage
them using current policies, but in the long term, to the year 2025 or so,
several trends will combine to make current policies unworkable.
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The information revolution is leading to widespread and rapid
dissemination of knowledge about weapons of mass destruction and other
weaponry. Much of the technology required for precision targeting is
embedded in widely diffusing civilian information technology. Although
the Clinton administration may be right that no rogue state will have the
technological capability to launch a missile attack on the United States in
the next fifteen years, the next thirty years could tell a very different story.
By 2025, capabilities for weapons of mass destruction and for precision
guidance of delivery systems are likely to be widely diffused.
Over the same period, given population pressures and rising income
levels, demands for industrial products (with their associated environmental
costs) will increase dramatically. By 2025, the planet will be far more
crowded than it is today, with at least two billion additional people, and
perhaps as many as four billion more.7 By comparison, the current world
population is about 5.8 billion people.8
These developments will take place in a world threatened by political
instability. Most of the swollen population will be poor, with about 95 per
cent of population growth occurring in poor countries and largely in the
poorer segments of those societies. Most will live in cities, often in
megalopolises which will have grown too fast to keep up with the demand
for basic infrastructure such as sewage, roads, decent housing, and water.9
Disparities between rich and poor will be accentuated. Although most
people's incomes will rise, income disparities between rich and poor will grow
even more rapidly, because the rich are starting off at a much higher base. If
China grows at a per capita rate of 7 per cent a year from now until 2025 (a
rate better than the best sustained per capita growth rate ever seen, South
Korea's 6.5 per cent), and the United States continues to grow at the per capita
rate of 1.5 per cent, the difference in per capita income would widen from
$24,500 to $35,271. Under this scenario, which exaggerates China's likely
growth relative to the U.S., incomes would continue to diverge until 2041.
This is likely to be a politically fragmented world, divided by much
more than national boundaries. There are hundreds if not thousands of
identifiable ethnic and other groups with a reasonable claim to at least a
degree of self-determination.10 Growing numbers of such groups are
clamouring for at least some of the attributes of statehood, although
relatively few have the wherewithal to survive as independent polities."
Whatever the political organization of the future turns out to be, it will lack
the relative clarity of the nation-state system as we have traditionally
understood it.
These developments are more than likely. The fragmentation of political
identity is already well under way.12 The population surge will occur
because the parents of that population are already born. Income disparities
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will grow unless the economies of the rich countries collapse. Nonetheless,
because most people in that rapidly expanding population are becoming
absolutely (even if not relatively) richer, demands for the products of
industrial economies - cars, houses, clothes, televisions - will soar,
introducing vast quantities of ill-regulated pollutants.
In short, nearly a billion people will be added to the world's population
each decade, most relatively poor but all needing food to eat, a place to live,
resources to consume, and a job. Their political loyalties will be fickle and
are unlikely to be based on a strong sense of national identity. They may not
be much moved by pleas to constrain their own still relatively low standards
of living for the sake of protecting the environment. Most will live in cities,
readily accessible to demagogues, for whom external enemies have
historically provided an inviting target. And the information revolution will
ensure both that most of the poor will be aware of the disparities in
standards of living and that information on all kinds of weapons, including
weapons of mass destruction, will be widely available.
One solution would be sustainable economic development adequate to
improve standards of living and to create stable middle classes in most
societies. Yet even under the best of circumstances, there are good reasons
to believe that humanity is unlikely to grow its way out of its troubles
quickly, and almost surely not quickly enough to avoid the problems
described in this piece. Environmentally sustainable means of development
may be possible but are not yet well developed. Furthermore, too many
parts of the world lack the political and institutional infrastructure needed to
develop or adopt environmentally benign new technologies at a sufficient
rate and to channel capital appropriately.13
Thus, these trends set the conditions for greater supply of and demand
for both the means of violence and environmentally hazardous materials.
Diffuse, sub-state violence may emerge from frustrations and resentments
inherent in inequitable development, and that violence could take the form
of precisely targeted attacks on rich-country targets. It would hardly be
unprecedented for demagogues to rise to power by blaming the problems of
their followers on external targets. With targeting information provided by
global positioning satellites and other readily available information, the
currently remote targets of the rich countries may not be so inaccessible,
even to sub-state actors. And not all rich-world targets will be far away. As
the economy becomes increasingly globalized, firms based in one country
could be badly hurt by attacks on their foreign direct investments.14 And
most if not all parts of the world will be living through the results of an
uncontrolled chemistry experiment on the consequences of introducing tens
of thousands of untested chemicals into planetary cycles.
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Characteristics of the Problems
The apparently disparate problems of proliferation and toxification share
several characteristics that make them amenable to similar solutions. Both
involve the use of materials that are embedded in legitimate economic
activities that cannot be readily halted, a kind of 'dual-use' problem that
goes far beyond the difficulties familiar from the use of fissile materials for
nuclear power. Nuclear proliferation concerns involve a relatively small
number of actors and a still relatively small quantity of dangerous materials.
But when proliferation is expanded to include chemical and biological
weapons and delivery systems, the quantity and diversity of materials and
technologies that must be viewed as part of the threat increase by orders of
magnitude. Both proliferation and toxification involve increasing quantities
of potentially dangerous materials or technologies because of increasing
demand for those legitimate products. Both involve large numbers of actors,
private and governmental, who are buying and selling these potentially
dangerous materials and/or technologies on a daily basis. Success in
addressing these dangers may require instituting some system of control
over vast numbers of economic transactions, without stifling the economic
vitality on which global well-being ultimately depends.
There are, of course, differences between control of proliferation and
environmental regulation. Most important is that externalities in the
environment are truly consequences that are unintended and unwanted by
everyone. Companies would be quite happy to eliminate all hazardous
substances from their production processes were it technologically feasible
and economically profitable to do so. In the case of proliferation, however,
someone wants that 'externality', meaning that there is a market for it. In
the environmental case, the problem is solely one of preventing firms from
free-riding, using less expensive but more hazardous technologies and
substances than their competitors. In the proliferation case, it will be
necessary to avoid both free-riding and deliberate circumvention of
whatever control regime exists.
Yet the similarities outweigh the differences. Both will require
controlling the damaging externalities of perfectly legitimate, indeed
essential, economic transactions. There is likely to be very limited resources
or political support for traditional regulation. Somehow, it will be necessary
to permit commerce in potentially hazardous substances and technologies
among many decentralized actors.
Proliferation
The dangers posed by proliferation of arms, particularly weapons of mass
destruction, are well understood. Such weapons, if used, would cause
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massive devastation, and the more actors possessing them, the greater the
risk of use. The mere possession of such weapons, even if they are not used,
may greatly exacerbate regional tensions, destabilizing already volatile
situations and enhancing the power of pariah states or terrorist groups. Even
a single use of a nuclear weapon would break a taboo that has held for more
than fifty years, in itself a powerful restraint on actors considering the use
of nuclear weapons.
The proliferation threat is escalating with the diffusion and evolution of
technology. The very capability to attack targets which enabled the United
States to win the Gulf War so handily grew out of commercially developed
technologies. It is true that no other country will come close in the
foreseeable future to matching the US capability for what William Perry has
described as the 'reconnaissance strike force', which includes command,
control, communications, and intelligence, precision-guided munitions, and
defense suppression.15 But even lacking this full spectrum of capabilities,
many countries and sub-state actors could strike out with lethal
effectiveness at civilian targets, using widely available technology to locate
targets, possibly combined with primitive but effective weapons of mass
destruction. In short, given the realities of global economic integration,
many more actors, both state and others, have or will obtain access to the
technologies underlying weapons of mass destruction or the means of
guiding weapons across great distances and landing them precisely on
target.
Toxification
The degree of danger from environmental toxification, by contrast, is only
just now being recognized. Toxic substances of all kinds are flooding the
planet, the inevitable concomitant of existing industrialization practices.
Toxification refers to the accumulation of toxic substances in individual
biological organisms or in the biosphere generally from anthropogenic
materials flows. This accumulation can have a variety of unpleasant effects,
ranging from neurological harm to a single organism (as in lead poisoning)
to the disruption of entire ecosystems.
The extent of the threat is unknown, and at this point unknowable, but
the signs are ominous. The environmental and health effects of the more
than 50,000 chemicals produced annually for use in industrial processes
remain largely unexplored. Even information about who is producing
potentially hazardous chemicals, where and in what ways they are being
used, or how the products are being disposed of, is at best difficult to find.
No one has a comprehensive overview that would make it possible to track
products containing hazards or to monitor the processes that produce them.
The levels of toxic material flows being introduced by human activity go
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well beyond anything seen in nature, often by orders of magnitude."
Moreover, it is not only the levels but the total accumulation that matters.
Many of the substances persist for decades if not centuries. Heavy metals
such as lead, mercury, and other potent toxins, for example, were widely
used for decades before their hazards became known, and these elements do
not decompose into less dangerous substances. Even once the hazard is
known, the economic utility of many hazardous substances can make it
difficult to restrict the pollution. Much of the world still burns leaded
gasoline. The best-known example of toxification may be the destruction of
stratospheric ozone by man-made chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), chemicals
which until recently were widely used as refrigerants, aerosol propellants,
and industrial cleansers. It was largely accidental that the harmful effects of
CFC use were discovered in time for a global ban to prevent real
catastrophe. It is thought possible that toxification has played a part in the
decline of German forests, the demise of coral reefs around the world, and
the sudden decimation of many species of frog.
The Limits of Traditional Solutions
The phenomena of proliferation and toxification will be among the most
serious threats to human well-being for at least the next several decades. Yet
neither traditional strategies aimed at denying access to certain goods and
technologies nor other conceivable alternatives hold much promise for
abating these threats.
Neither American nor broader global interests are well served by the
current policy debates on proliferation and toxification. The debate assumes
that the options for proliferation policy are limited to incremental changes
to existing policy (a combination of diplomatic efforts aimed at dissuading
potential proliferators and export controls to deny key technologies and
materials to hold-out states) and/or the development of military
countermeasures to deal with proliferation once it occurs. But existing
policy could only be effective if the sole proliferators of concern were
states, if states had full knowledge of and control over their imports and
exports, and if controlling exports of a limited set of goods and technologies
could prevent the proliferation of all the weapons systems and technologies
of concern.
The debate over toxification policy is much less developed, having
begun in earnest only with the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development in 1992. Follow-up efforts related to environmental
toxification are still at a very preliminary stage. Within the United States,
clean-up efforts have been harshly criticized on all sides, as epitomized by
the notoriously controversial Superfund programme which was too
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
8:4
1 1
2 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
58 ARMS CONTROL: NEW APPROACHES
expensive, often ineffective, and overwhelmed by the difficulty of
determining whom to hold accountable for the contamination of specific
sites.
A strategy that emphasizes broad-based denial of access to potentially
dangerous products cannot adequately deal with either proliferation or
toxification. It is useless to address toxification, because no state or
reasonably small group of states controls the supply of hazardous
substances used in industrial production. Even in those cases where supply
could be controlled, denial of access would mean undercutting essential
economic activities involving feedstock chemicals. With regard to
proliferation, the denial approach has already accomplished most of what it
can achieve in restraining proliferation. Much of the success of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, for example, has depended on two factors:
cooperation among a small number of supplier states who restricted their
nuclear exports to other countries, and the existence of technological
bottlenecks stemming from the difficulty of acquiring either highly enriched
uranium or plutonium to make a bomb. Neither condition still holds, even
in the nuclear area. The problem of proliferation no longer consists merely
of a small number of supplier states exporting nuclear goods and
technologies to recipient countries. The world is awash in weapons-usable
plutonium, much of it not under effective international control, and the
number of existing or potential near-term suppliers of nuclear materials and
technology has sharply increased. This renders inadequate the centralized,
generally coercive application of regulations aimed at denying access to
certain goods and technologies. Other kinds of weapons proliferation,
including chemical, biological, and technologies related to delivery
systems, have even fewer choke points at which controls could be applied.
The denial strategy cannot be made effective by simple extension. The
sheer number of goods and substances whose exports would have to be
restricted dwarfs any previous efforts at denial-based controls. No relatively
short list of forbidden exports could suffice. With regard to proliferation, the
threats increasingly lie in the area of computer technologies, chemicals, and
biotechnology; goods and technologies with both civilian and military uses
and no ready distinction between them. To give just one example, the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which came into force in spring 1997,
covers more than three dozen chemicals, with provision made for adding to
the list." Moreover, scores of states and thousands of firms are now
numbered among the suppliers of all the goods and technologies of concern.
With regard to toxification, there are over 50,000 chemicals used in
production processes, of which only a few hundred have been adequately
tested for their environmental and health effects. In this area, we do not even
yet know what needs controlling. Clearly, simply banning all trade in dual-
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use technologies and all products containing hazardous or potentially
hazardous substances is not the answer.
A post hoc approach has problems as well. The US Department of
Defense has established a Counterproliferation Initiative that aims to equip
United States forces to face adversaries who possess nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons. The initiative incorporates development of new
technologies and new military strategies aimed at current or likely
proliferators. Unfortunately, rather than deterring proliferation, this
approach could effectively reinstate an arms race, this time against
unknown opponents who may see the policy as an incentive to proliferate
so as to be able to confront - or deter - the United States. And, of course,
a counter-proliferation strategy is only useful after proliferation has
occurred. A post hoc response to toxification is even more unattractive.
Many pollutants of concern, such as heavy metals, cannot be effectively
cleaned up once they have been dispersed into the environment, and the
effects of many others are simply unknown.
A Growing Role for Transparency
In time, transparency measures may be able to do what denial strategies and
countermeasures alone cannot. By allowing legitimate uses (and emissions)
of the goods and substances of concern to be easily traced, transparency
would make the task of would-be proliferators harder, and it would make
assessing responsibility for the unwanted side-effects of toxic substances
much easier. Perhaps most important, it can enlist the potent force of public
opinion, while imposing much less of a regulatory burden than would exist
under alternative policies.
Transparency can serve three quite different purposes. Most familiar in
arms control is its deterrent effect: signatories to treaties refrain from
violating the accords because the verification provisions make the
likelihood of being caught and punished unacceptably high. Also
increasingly familiar is the role of transparency in providing reassurance: a
means by which actors can prove that they are not misusing goods and
technologies. Much less known in arms control, but beginning to emerge in
the environmental field, is the revelatory effect of transparency. As will be
described below, the institution of transparency requirements can provide
actors with information about the consequences of their own activities,
information they would never have obtained without the requirement to do
so but which, once gathered, can spur dramatic changes in the actors'
behaviour. The Russian government might not have been aware of the
degree to which its fissile material was unsafely stored without
Washington's prodding and assistance, but once made aware, both
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governments found improving the situation to be in their mutual interest.
The growing acceptance of transparency could act as the basis for
creating transparency systems which could serve all three goals, tracking
the goods and substances of concern throughout their life cycles. They
would rely primarily on self-reporting, requiring producers to provide
information about the ultimate consequences of their production. In the case
of dual-use technologies, firms wishing to export such items would have to
provide information about the end-user. With regard to toxification,
producers would be required to report not only on their emissions of
hazardous substances as wastes, but on the presence of hazardous
constituents (above a threshold) in the goods they produce. Such tracking
would make it possible to follow a hazard throughout its life cycle.
Similarly, it may be possible to label a wide range of products and
substances in such a way that they can be tracked throughout their life
cycles. Los Alamos National Laboratory has developed tags that cannot be
duplicated or tampered with which could be attached to a product or
container. (The tags were intended to help verify compliance with the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, so that permitted numbers of
tanks and other systems could be labelled and readily distinguished from
those not so labelled. The treaty's verification provisions in the end did not
require the use of the tags, and they are still sitting on the shelf at Los
Alamos.) Along the same lines, chemical co-tracers could be added during
the manufacturing process to chemical substances which would make it
possible to identify the point of origin of the chemicals.
This system could not rely solely on state-to-state negotiation. Ideally,
the system would enlist the cooperation of suppliers and consumers alike to
make transfers of goods and technologies far more transparent. As has been
increasingly the case with arms control negotiations, at the least the relevant
producers would have to be willing participants. And because such a vast
range of goods and substances are now relevant to proliferation and
toxification, a very significant proportion of the world's economic actors
should be included.
While only a few very large firms have the resources to maintain control
of their hazardous or dual-use products throughout their life cycles,
information-revolution technology is making it feasible for a wide range of
producers to monitor where those products go. With currently available or
easily developed technologies, for example, miniature computerized
tracking devices could be attached to virtually any product. This regulation
by transparency would permit most economic activities to take place
unhindered, but would require that they be conducted in a way that is readily
monitored. Producers would be responsible for recording what hazardous
constituents or dual-use technologies are contained in their products and
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where they go. Such transparency would make it possible to detect early
efforts to acquire weapons capabilities or to dump large quantities of
hazardous substances without interfering with legitimate trade. It would
also greatly facilitate pollution prevention.
It requires a change of mindset to recognize that producers have an
obligation to provide information concerning the contents of their products,
the uses to which their products are put and the ways in which their products
are disposed of. It is this normative change that will be necessary for a
transparency-based approach to work. Encouraging precedents provide
hope that such a norm change is not unfeasible. Nuclear power producers
have long recognized a special responsibility to account for their highly
dangerous materials. Chemical producers have taken some steps down this
road as well, as evidenced by the Chemical Manufacturers' Association's
strong support for the highly intrusive verification provisions of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. As in these cases, producers can recognize
that effective and reasonable regulation of the hazardous materials they use
can stave off public demands for harsher regulation later on. Producers in
countries that are particularly likely to impose national regulations may
support international regulation as a means of levelling the economic
playing field for themselves.
Indeed, the CWC provides a most compelling example of the
possibilities of transparency. Any regime of reasonably effective constraints
on chemical weapons capabilities requires an unprecedented degree of
transparency simply because the substances at issue are ubiquitous. The
same chemicals that have revolutionized agriculture and medicine in this
century can be used to make chemical weapons. Because these substances
are so widespread and so thoroughly integrated into the fabric of the
international economy, with a few exceptions they cannot simply be banned.
Instead, the verification net must be cast both wide and deep, covering an
enormous range of chemicals and imposing stringent verification
requirements.
The CWC divides chemicals into three categories known as 'schedules'.
Each category is subject to different verification provisions. Schedule 1
chemicals are either directly usable as weapons or easily transformed into
weapons, and have few if any other uses. Each party is allowed to maintain
one small-scale production facility to conduct medical, pharmaceutical, and
protective research with Schedule 1 chemicals, stockpiling a total of no
more than one ton of these substances.18 Such facilities will be subject to
monitoring and on-site inspection as deemed appropriate by the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the body established
by the Convention to implement its terms." Schedule 2 chemicals are
generally precursors to Schedule 1 substances or are otherwise toxic, but
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have some recognized limited commercial uses. Facilities producing
Schedule 2 chemicals will be subject to inspection if their production levels
exceed certain thresholds.20 Schedule 3 substances are those that can directly
be used as chemical weapons or are precursors to Schedule 1 or Schedule 2
chemicals, but are produced in large commercial quantities. Again, facilities
that produce these substances in sufficiently large amounts will be subject
to regular inspection.21 In addition, under certain conditions there can be
very short notice challenge inspections 'of any facility or location in the
territory of or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of any ...
state Party'.22 These will take place according to a system of 'managed
access' intended to allow states to protect sensitive national security or
commercial proprietary data, while enabling the inspectors to determine
whether the convention has been violated.23 Despite the intrusiveness of
these inspection requirements, the US manufacturers of the chemicals
covered by the treaty, who were deeply involved in the negotiations, have
been among its strongest supporters.
Centralized Control?
Clearly, states must play a key role in establishing a transparency-based
system. Indeed, one way to proceed would be to create a centralized
international system. The information from monitoring systems would be
recorded in an international registry that would note the producer, the
consumer, and the end use of a wide range of goods and substances. On the
proliferation side, such a registry could then be used to determine whether
an importer was attempting to acquire a surreptitious weapons capability a
piece at a time, as Iraq so successfully did prior to the Gulf War. With regard
to toxification, the registry would enable governments to track
concentrations of hazardous products and emissions, information that could
prove invaluable as more becomes known about the effects of currently
untested chemicals and their interactions. Information in the registry would
be subject to verification by national inspections, or the information
provided by self-reporting could be gathered and to some degree verified by
an international institution.
This transparency would bolster the effectiveness of a denial strategy,
making any export-licensing system far more effective and efficient. Export
licenses for dual-used goods and technologies could be denied if a
suspicious pattern were detected long before a full weapons capability could
be developed.24 The centralized system would provide a valuable database
and could allow states to coordinate their exports de facto.
But, as described above, a denial strategy can at best play only a small
part in controlling proliferation and toxification. The centralized use of the
information gathered through required transparency may improve the
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effectiveness of the denial strategy, but not enough to overcome its
fundamental flaws. Furthermore, a proposal to establish another
bureaucratic layer regulating international trade or national economic
activity is unlikely to meet with a warm response anywhere.
Moreover, efforts to establish and maintain the registry could be fatally
undermined by the free-rider problem, as the example of the current effort
to expand the scope of multilateral nuclear safeguards illustrates.25
Following the revelations about the extent of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear
programme that ensued in the wake of the Gulf War and the concerns over
the North Korean programme, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) adopted voluntary transparency measures to increase information
about its members' nuclear programmes. A more radical proposal to
increase the effectiveness and efficiency of its safeguards system, however,
is running into a problem all too familiar to international institutions: no one
wants to pay for it. In brief, as the IAEA Board of Governors has debated
how to go about implementing improvements in the safeguards system that
would cost the IAEA itself money, almost all members have argued in
favour of the improvements. However, the members all seem to want
someone else to bear the cost. While all states, other than those that hope to
gain a surreptitious nuclear weapons capacity, would benefit from the
existence of a more reliable centralized system of gathering information
about the nuclear programmes of most of the world's countries, each state
recognizes that others have that interest and therefore hopes that the others
will pay the costs: the classic free-rider problem.
A Decentralized Approach
Transparency could be used quite differently, however, in ways that would
avoid the free-rider problem and would help to compensate for the
difficulties of the denial strategy. This alternative would rely on the
revelatory power of transparency. Most firms do not seek to contribute to
proliferation or toxification. They often do so out of ignorance or
competitive pressures. Many companies have little idea where the various
hazardous constituents of their waste streams originate and have even found
that they can significantly cut costs of production and waste treatment by
monitoring their own materials flows more closely. Even more important
may be the role of public pressure, a highly effective means of inducing
behavioural change among firms.
There are striking examples beginning to emerge in the environmental
arena of transparency-based approaches to environmental protection. Until
quite recently, American environmental regulation has concentrated more
on process than result. It was very difficult and expensive to go out into the
field and measure who was emitting what, and even harder to understand
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exactly what the environmental consequences of various emissions were.
Instead, regulators focused on forcing companies to change their industrial
processes, to replace equipment known to produce a lot of pollution with
equipment known to cause less pollution. When the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) goes out into the field, it does not measure
pollution around a facility. Instead, it checks to see whether the facility has
the permitted equipment and industrial processes in place.
No one has ever thought this was an ideal approach. It is bureaucratic
and inflexible. Two alternatives are emerging, both of which rely heavily on
the power of information to spur public - not governmental - action. In the
first, the government simply requires firms to provide information on
emissions or products containing hazards. In the second, non-state actors
take it on themselves to use emerging technologies to monitor toxic
emissions.
The Right to Know
A decade ago, the United States Congress passed a law, The Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986, requiring
manufacturers to report annually to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency on the quantities (over a baseline amount) of certain
chemicals they have released into the environment or transferred to another
facility.26 That information is compiled in a database called the Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI). In addition, a report must be made every time any
quantity of hazardous waste greater than a set amount is released.
Hazardous waste is waste containing any substance on a list maintained by
the Environmental Protection Agency.
The TRI is far from perfect. It reportedly suffers from serious under-
reporting and other inaccuracies. It covers only chemicals already known to
be toxic, and a fierce political battle is currently raging over EPA's efforts to
expand the number of chemicals listed. Yet it has had a dramatic and largely
unexpected impact, reducing the emissions of the reported chemicals at the
facilities covered by TRI by 44 per cent since 1988, while production of
those chemicals rose 18 per cent.27 In some cases, companies acted to revise
their production processes and cut down on emissions because their reports
made them aware of the money they were losing through unnecessarily
wasteful production processes. In others, the motivation came from the
desire to avoid suffering adverse publicity and angering local communities,
who were not pleased to learn what was being dumped on them. This has
occurred purely through the revelatory effect of the transparency
requirement. The law imposed no new limits on the quantities of chemicals
that could be released. It merely required companies to announce publicly
how much they were in fact releasing.
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As is so often the case, while the federal government was acting at the
national level, the state of California was going further. In 1986, the same
year that the TRI legislation was passed, California voters overwhelmingly
approved an initiative called the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic
Enforcement Act, better known as Proposition 65 .n Under this law, the state
publishes a list (updated annually) of chemicals known to the state to cause
cancer, birth defects or other reproductive harm. Over 550 such chemicals
were listed as of 1996. Once a chemical is listed, any business that
knowingly exposes anyone to a listed chemical must provide a 'clear and
reasonable' warning, through such means as labelling products, posting
signs at the workplace, or publishing notices in a newspaper.
The consequences of Proposition 65 have been as dramatic as those
associated with the TRI. Businesses have gone to great lengths to avoid
having to give warnings that they are exposing their customers or
employees to toxic substances. With no new bureaucracy or enforcement
mechanisms, air emissions of some listed chemicals have fallen
significantly. Businesses have reformulated production processes and
products so that listed chemicals are no longer used: trichloroethylene is no
longer used in most correction fluids, toluene has been removed from many
nail care products, and foil caps on wine bottles no longer contain lead.
Clearly, the right-to-know approach would not by itself resolve the
problem of proliferation. Some sellers and buyers would still have an
incentive to conceal what they are doing. Yet the approach would represent
a major step in the right direction by making transparent the vast sea of
legitimate transactions within which proliferation efforts can currently hide.
Private Action
Surprisingly little is actually known about the quantities of toxic emissions
coming from specific facilities. Other than the TRI reports, there are no
reporting requirements, and even the TRI reports are not verified through
independent measurements. Until recently, the only way to determine how
much of a given substance was being emitted by a given facility at a given
time was to take air samples back to a laboratory for testing. This left little
scope for non-governmental actors, including local community groups, to
monitor potential polluters in their midst. Now, the necessary monitoring
technologies are becoming available and sufficiently inexpensive that they
can be used by non-governmental organizations. For example, optical
remote sensing systems that can monitor the emissions of specific pollutants
from individual facilities are coming on the market.
Some of these systems are being used by community groups to keep a
wary eye on facilities in their neighborhoods. For example, in California a
major chemical disaster took place at the Unocal refinery in Rodeo in
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August-September 1994. Over the course of sixteen days, 125 tons of
caustic catalyst, including heavy metals and organics, sickened 1500 people
in the community, some of whom suffer lingering health effects. In
response, Communities for a Better Environment, a California non-profit
organization, and local citizens obtained an infra-red optical remote sensing
system (an R&D model provided by a vendor at a nominal cost), to take on
the road to Bay area communities downwind of Unocal and other refineries.
Applying Transparency
These environmental cases in the United States may provide the basis for
new thinking about the appropriate roles of governments and other actors in
addressing the increasingly diffuse threats of proliferation and toxification.
As they suggest,, relying solely on the revelatory power of transparency can
significantly affect the behaviour of businesses at relatively low cost to the
governments, while permitting businesses a great deal of flexibility in
finding the most efficient means to reduce or eliminate social harm.
There are several advantages to requiring the public provision of
information as a means of controlling the undesirable consequences of
legitimate economic activity. Firms that are unwittingly contributing to
problems would have the information necessary to stop. Firms would
become far more subject to public pressure. And perhaps most important,
the transparency-based system would isolate the true problem cases: the
firms, states, and groups that are up to no good would find it much harder
to take cover in the legitimate economy.
It is not Utopian to think that such information would motivate substantial
changes of behaviour on the part of business even in the absence of public
pressure. Examples abound of companies instituting significant changes on
environmental grounds even in the absence of current or impending legal
requirements to do so. The collaboration between McDonald's and the
Environmental Defense Fund to reduce the use of harmful packaging such as
Styrofoam is merely one of the better known cases. In one extreme example,
Ray Anderson, the CEO of a carpet-tile manufacturer called Interface, was
galvanized into action upon realizing that his own company's business was
environmentally unsustainable. The company is now investing heavily in
radical energy efficiency, using renewable energy sources, and attempting to
produce zero waste. In the most challenging effort, the company is now
proposing to lease rather than sell its carpet tiles. When the tiles wear out, the
company will take them back and recycle them - a substantial change in usual
business practice.29 Firms might welcome requirements for transparency if by
complying with such requirements they could shield themselves from legal
liability for unwittingly selling materials to proliferators.
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Nonetheless, it is likely that the more profound effect of requiring the
release of information comes from the force of public opinion, and here the
decentralized approach may have significant benefits. As Emily Goldman
argues elsewhere in this volume, compliance on the demand side of a
centralized transparency-based regime may prove very difficult, because
potential proliferators may perceive their interests in ways that make
proliferating more attractive than analyses of economic development needs
or military requirements would lead outsiders to assume. If indeed, as she
says, the goal of proliferators is to demonstrate sovereignty, the monitoring
and enforcement needs of a centralized transparency-based system may be
even more daunting than they initially appear. If so, the decentralized
approach proposed here becomes even more attractive by comparison. Not
only could it greatly increase the numbers of eyes and ears engaged in
monitoring, but it could also add a much-enhanced element of social
disapproval to the available punishments for buyers and (more likely)
sellers of misdirected dual-use technology. Companies can be fined by
governments. They can be shamed by their fellow citizens.
As has generally been the case with the information provided by the
TRI, non-state actors, particularly non-governmental organizations, will
have a crucial role in this decentralized use of transparency. They have the
capacity to monitor and advocate action based on information about the
behaviour of firms, and indeed this is often their raison d'etre. Non-
governmental organizations dedicated to specific issues often have
resources to apply to monitoring that overstretched governments do not, as
the frequent lawsuits brought by US NGOs against corporate polluters
demonstrate. Information and analysis would not necessarily flow only in
one direction, of course. Firms would obviously have an incentive to
monitor whether their competitors' products are being used in socially
undesirable ways. But the disinterested analysis of NGOs motivated by the
promotion of socially desirable behaviour rather than the bottom line would
have far greater credibility with the general public.
Problems
The idea of using public transparency as a (partial) means of coping with the
growing dangers represented by proliferation and toxification raises some
knotty problems. First is the issue of what goods and substances should be
covered by the requirement to provide information, and what information
should be provided. Businesses are likely to be averse to requirements that
are as broad as the numbers of potential dangers would indicate. Both the
Toxics Release Inventory and Proposition 65 are restricted to 'listed'
chemicals. And despite the Chemical Manufacturers' Association's (CMA)
claims of support for the TRI, when the Environmental Protection Agency
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tried to double the number of chemicals listed, CMA sued to stop it. (CMA
lost the suit, but the case is now on appeal.)
Another problem is the issue of the capacity of some societies to take
advantage of the information provided, or even to provide the information.
Transparency, to be effective, requires a fair degree of technical and
managerial competence widely distributed among the personnel of the state,
business managers, and non-governmental organizations. It only works if
the necessary information really gets out and if the civil society is able to
organize and act in response to the information. This capacity is currently
lacking in many parts of the world. Thus, the use of transparency as a means
of addressing proliferation and toxification would require assistance in
building such capacity.
At the international level, one environmental agreement provides an
example of the difficulty of relying on transparency in lieu of regulation.
The Basel Convention on Transboundary Hazardous Waste requires
shippers of hazardous waste to receive the prior informed consent of any
state to which it wishes to export such substances. Some ninety developing
countries have signed a protocol noting that they do not wish to receive any
hazardous wastes. But this approach is seriously flawed. Few developing
countries are in a position to enforce the ban. There are no monitoring or
enforcement provisions. In any case, the convention only deals with
hazardous materials during one portion of their life cycle, and ignores them
when they are serving as (no less hazardous) inputs or products.
A third problem has to do with the difficulty of implementing the
transparency approach in a coherent fashion across the board, given the
bureaucratic division of decision-making. In the United States, monitoring
and control of toxic substances, for example, tends to be divided up
bureaucratically according to the medium - air, water, or soil - in which the
hazard is found, with the result that incentives are created for cross-media
shifting of pollutants rather than their actual control. Similarly, non-
proliferation efforts are divided into several different issue areas (biological
weapons, chemical, nuclear, and delivery systems such as missiles) with
little coordination among the regimes. This division is mirrored in the
domestic bureaucratic structure of the United States, rendering it unlikely
that anyone in the government will take the lead in creating a monitoring
system that provides a comprehensive overview of the problems.30
Fourth, as mentioned earlier, some actors will not want to cease their
proliferation behaviour, and transparency imposes no active constraints
against them. Depending on the adequacy of the transparency regime, a
voluntary transparency system could create false confidence and undermine
the goal of non-proliferation. Moreover, if the price for international
agreement on transparency were to be increased access to dual use materials
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
ing
ap
or
e M
an
ag
em
en
t U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
8:4
1 1
2 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
A NEW ROLE FOR TRANSPARENCY 69
and technologies that would otherwise have been at least somewhat
constrained by denial measures, the transparency approach might actually
make the situation worse."
Conclusion
Once it is widely recognized that proliferation and toxification represent
significant and growing dangers, governments will find themselves under
increasing pressure to do something about them. Neither the denial strategy
nor after-the-fact countermeasures will suffice. This is not to say that the
transparency-based approach advocated here is a panacea. A decentralized
system that relies on the revelatory power of transparency certainly will not
resolve all the dangers of proliferation or toxification. On the proliferation
side, the increased requirements for transparency on the part of firms should
complement, not replace, the array of measures in place.32 For the problem
of toxification, on the other hand, where there are very few existing
agreements, international negotiations may be needed in addition to the
transparency measures advocated here. A permissive but transparent system
is likely to be far more cost-effective for governments as well as far more
appealing to the private sector than would be the expansion of the more
heavy-handed approaches to which governments are accustomed.
The transparency system would require willing compliance with
demands for information that has long been viewed as legitimately secret.
Acceptance of a norm of transparency has already occurred to a degree
unpredictable - indeed, unthinkable - a decade ago, both in arms control
between sovereign states and, within the United States, regarding the
environmental impact of certain economic activities. But many questions
remain concerning how a transparency-based regime could balance
legitimate rights of privacy and secrecy against societal needs to monitor
potentially dangerous goods and technologies and how the necessary broad
consensus could be formulated.
The transparency system calls for a substantial change in norms about
the responsibilities of producers of legitimate civilian goods. The new norm
would require that ignorance no longer be bliss - namely, that producers
could not claim lack of knowledge about the harm their products or
production processes could do, because they would be legally required to
have and share that knowledge. Such a norm change may require altering a
mindset that sees transparency as a public good - that is, as a social benefit
that everyone wants to receive but to which no one perceives an individual
incentive to contribute. Transparency has private benefits to an actor that
provides information about itself. Transparency can allow an actor to
reassure others about its intentions and performance, thus staving off more
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coercive regulation or the possibility of a spiral into a security dilemma.
Requirements for transparency can enable firms to discover useful
information about themselves without undergoing expenses to which
competitor firms are not subject. US leadership will be essential to the
creation of this system, and US businesses, who are already subject to some
degree of transparency-based regulation, may strongly support the
extension of the approach as a means of ensuring a level playing field.
The centralized registry may prove to be the ultimate goal, if all the
hurdles can be overcome. But even if they cannot, the provision of
information to the general public is in and of itself a useful tool. The TRI
and Proposition 65 are good models, far from perfect but also clearly better
than the alternatives. Transparency has advantages beyond the confidence-
building role familiar from arms control, advantages that will apply both to
proliferation and to toxificatibn, or indeed to any issue area where
ignorance, intentionally or not, can cause harm.
A fully effective set of policies to stem proliferation and toxification will
have to include regulatory measures in addition to transparency, to deal with
actors who are not susceptible to the shaming effects of publicity. But
transparency alone has dramatic effects and should be pursued even if an
effective and coordinated set of policies is not yet feasible. Indeed,
transparency, by isolating the bad apples, may contribute to making that
wider strategy more acceptable and easier to implement.
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